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The Man Who Would Be Caliph: A Sixteenth-Century Sultan' s Bi d
for an African Empir e
By Stephen Cory
Introduction
In the early months of 1591 , local villagers from the West African Songha y Empire spotted
an unusual sight. ' Movin g at a  steady pace across the desert was an army of some 3,000 -
4,000 soldiers , armed wit h cannon s an d muskets. - I f th e villager s ha d no t know n better ,
they surel y woul d hav e thought themselves t o be the victims of a  desert mirage . Bu t thi s
surprising vision was no trick of light reflecting of f the golden sand s of the Sahara. Within
days, th e Morocca n arm y ha d reassemble d itsel f o n th e bank s o f th e Nige r Rive r an d
would soo n defeat a  hastily constructe d Songha y forc e o f betwee n 28,000-50.00 0 me n at
the Battle of Tondibi (March 13 , 1591).-' West Africa would never be the same again.
It was the Sa~di sultan Mula y Ahma d al-Mansur wh o undertook thi s risky venture ,
which no other Moroccan ruler has attempted before or since. In 1590 . al-Mansur launched
a full-scale invasio n o f the Songhay Empire , after seekin g t o gain control over the region
for a  number of years . The Moroccan sulta n claime d h e undertook thi s attack t o unify th e
Muslim land s of weste m Afric a unde r on e leader . An d wh o could b e a  better choic e a s
monarch than al-Mansur himself, the sharifian descenden t of the Prophet and the legitimate
leader of the entire Muslim world ? Although thi s claim to right of sovereignty woul d have
been vigorously disputed by the Turkish sultan in Istanbul, the Ottomans had not been able
to extend their empire into West Africa an d could do nothing to assist the Songhay in their
predicament.
What wer e aI-Mansur" s motive s fo r invadin g Wes t Africa ? Th e reason s give n b y
Mulay Ahma d himsel f deriv e from hi s claim t o be the divinely-appointed calip h over the
international Musli m community ; an d thu s h e asserted hi s right t o secure th e submissio n
and prope r defens e o f Islami c lands . However , mos t historian s believ e tha t al-Mansur' s
considerations wer e mor e materia l tha n spiritua l whe n h e undertoo k hi s controversia l
' Th e Songha y Empir e wa s establishe d b y Sunn i Al i i n th e lat e fifteent h century . It s centra l land s
consisted of the Middle Niger Rive r region, including the cities of Jenne. Timbuktu, and Gao. an area mostly
contained i n the modem countrie s of Mali , Burkina Faso , and Niger . A t it s greatest height , it s territory als o
extended int o the modern countrie s of Senega l an d Nigeria . The empire gaine d muc h o f it s wealth throug h
controlling the southem end of the prosperous trans-Saharan gol d trade.
^ For the estimated numbe r of Moroccan troops, see John Hunwick . Timhiiklu and ihe Songhav Empire:
Al-Sa'di's Tarîkh al-südän down to 1613 and Oilier Conlemporary Docurnenls (Leiden : Brill , 19y9) , 18 8 n.
13. ;
• Fo r th e estimate d numbe r o f Songha y troop s a t Tondibi , se e Hunwick , Timbuktu and the Songhay
Empire. 189-190 n. 25.
Tassault upon a fellow Muslim dynasty.'' They maintain the sharif haô an insatiable desire to
gain ful l contro l ove r th e prosperous gol d trad e tha t ha d bee n carrie d o n fo r eenturie s i n
West Africa.' ' Indeed , th e influ x o f gol d int o Morocco , a  direc t resul t o f thi s invasion ,
earned al-Mansur the title of "al-Dhahabi" ('The golden one").
Those who argue that greed was the principal motive for the invasion can point to a
number o f primar y source s tha t see m t o suppor t thei r charge . An d yet , carefu l
consideration o f al l th e historica l evidenc e reveal s thi s interpretatio n t o b e overl y
simplistic. A  complex an d extraordinarily ambitiou s man , Mulay Ahma d ha d a  vision fa r
greater tha n simpl y stuffin g hi s coffers wit h Songha y gold . The Morocca n sulta n sa w hi s
conquest o f Songha y a s the firs t ste p i n a  grand schem e t o unit e Islami c Afric a unde r a
revived Arab caliphate, this time arising from th e west rather than the east. His goals were
no les s tha n t o challeng e th e might y Ottoma n Empir e itself . Al-Mansur' s claim s
represented a n attemp t b y a n Earl y Mode m monarc h t o reinvigorat e a n institutio n (th e
caliphate) tha t ha d bee n importan t durin g th e earlies t centurie s o f Islam , bu t whic h ha d
vanished in all but name after the decline and fall of the Abbasid Empire.^
The Fight for North Africa
By 1591 , Morocco's internationa l positio n ha d improve d dramaticall y ove r a  perio d o f
fifty years . Al the beginning of the sixteenth century, the country was on the brink of being
divided among several foreign powers . The Portuguese had made considerable inroads into
Morocco by subjugating a  series of ports on the Mediterranean an d Atlantic coasts."^ Fresh
from it s final conques t o f al-Andalus . the newly powerfu l Spanis h stat e was beginning t o
show interest i n the Maghrib as well, capturing Mediterranean port s in modern-day Algeri a
and Tunisia . An d th e Ottoma n dynast y als o threatene d fro m th e east , havin g recentl y
established foothold s i n eastern an d centra l Nort h Africa , fro m wher e i t battled Spai n fo r
Mediterranean supremacy.* * I n th e fac e o f suc h challenges , th e wea k Wattasi d dynasty .
'' Fo r this argument, see E.W. Bovill , The Golden Trade of the Moors (1958; reprint. Princeton; Marku s
Wciner, 1995) , 154-202: Charles-André Julien, History of North Africa from the Arab Conquest to 1830, cd.
Roger L e Tourneau . trans . John Pctric , re-ed . C.C . Stewar t (1952 ; reprint . Ne w York : Pracgc r Publishers ,
1970), 232-235; Abdallah Laroui , The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay, trans. Ralph Manheim
(Princeton: Princeto n Universit y Press , 1977) , 256-58 ; Jerom e Bruc e Weiner , "Hitna , Corsairs , an d
Diplomacy: Morocc o an d th e Maritim e State s o f Wester n Europe , 1603-1672 " (Ph.D . thesis,  Columbi a
University, 1976) , 36-37.
- A  .ï/iiir(/(plural: shurafa') i s an individual who claims to be descended fro m th e Prophet Muhammad .
In Morocco, most shurafa' trac e their lineage through Muhammad' s grandson Hasan .
Most historian s believ e tha t th e Abbasi d caliphat e wa s i n ful l declin e b y th e lat e nint h century .
However, the Abbasids continued to claim the position of caliph until the Mongols sacked Baghda d in 1258 .
7 Fo r th e histor y o f th e Portugues e outpost s i n Morocco , se e Vasc o d e Carvalho , La domination
portugaise au Maroc du XVeme mi XVIlIeme siècle {¡415-1769) (Lisbon : SPN , 1942) ; Pierr e d e Cenivai ,
trans.. Chronique de Santa Cruz do Cap de Gue (Paris : Gcuthner , 1934) ; an d j . Goulven, La Place de
Mazagan sous la dominai ion portugaise (1502-1769) (Paris : Emile Larose , 1917) . Robert Ricar d has written
extensively o n the Portuguese colonial perio d i n Morocco , including Rober t Ricard , Études sur t histoire des
Portugais au Maroc (Coimbra, Port.; Universidade de Coimbra, 1955) .
Iwhich rule d fro m Fez . sought to maintain whateve r sovereignty i t eould throug h alliance s
with one or another of these foreign powers .
It wa s i n response t o this foreign threa t tha t th e Sa'd i state , rising ou t of the fertil e
Sus valle y i n souther n Morocco , firs t gaine d momentum . Th e earlies t Sa'd i sultan s
garnered a following throug h their claim to be direct descendants of ihe Prophet. Declaring
a hol y wa r against the Portuguese intruders , those sultan s won some impressive victories .
After expellin g th e Portugues e fro m souther n Morocco , th e Saudi s buil t a  ptiwer bas e in
Marrakesh fro m whic h the y launche d a  full-scal e attac k o n th e crumblin g Wattasi d
dynasty."^  Thei r eonques t o f Fe z i n 154 9 pu t the m int o direc t confrontatio n wit h th e
Ottomans, who had been hoping to gain entry int o the country through that important city .
The Sa'd i sulta n Muhamma d al-Shayk h gaine d credibilit y b y fighting  th e superio r
Ottoman forces to a standstill nearTlemcen, checking their westward advance.' "
However, th e greates t Sa'd i vietor y wa s t o come a  fe w decade s later . Concerne d
about thei r flagging fortunes i n Moroeco, the Portugues e launche d a n all-ou t invasio n o f
the country. This proved to be a disastrous mistake . In 1578 . the forces o f King Sebastian
suffered a  crushin g defea t a t th e hand s o f th e SaMi s a t Wad i al-Makhaza n i n norther n
Morocco. Sebastia n himsel f wa s killed i n this battle, along wit h the Sa'di sulta n 'Ab d al -
Malik an d hi s rival.  al-Mutawakkil . whic h le d Europeans t o refer t o the conflict a s "The
Battle ofthe Thre e Kings." " Amids t a n aura of increasin g internationa l prestige . Ahmad
al-Mansur ros e to the sultanate . Althoug h Mula y Ahma d ha d remained i n the shadows of
Sa'di politics , th e Ottoman s an d Spaniard s wer e mistake n i f the y though t the y coul d
manipulate this quiet man. Al-Mansur proved to be shrewd and capable, and he was able to
protect hi s countr y fro m invasio n b y superio r foreig n force s throughou t hi s twenty-flv e
years in power.
Once h e establishe d authorit y withi n hi s domain s an d secure d hi s border s fro m
outside invaders , th e ambitiou s youn g sulta n looke d fo r opportunitie s t o exten d hi s
influence abroad . Living in the shadow of the famous Almoravi d an d Almohad dynasties ,
" Fo r a summary o f Ottoman expansio n an d rule i n North Africa , se e Jamil M . Abun-Nasr. A History of
the Maghrib in the Islamic Period (Cambridge: Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1987) . 144—205 ; and Laroui ,
The History of ¡he Maghrib, 273-335 . Fo r th e Ottoma n competitio n wit h Spai n ove r Nort h Africa , se e
Andrew C . Hess , The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier
{Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1978).
^ The Sa'dis ' main military victory over the Portuguese along the Moroccan coast was their conquest of
Santa Craz (modem Agadir ) i n 1540 . Following tha t victory , the Portugues e decided t o cut thei r losse s and
pulled ou t o f Saf i an d Azemmour . althoug h the y refortifie d Mazaga n (moder n A l Jadida) . which the y hel d
until 1769 . For the significance o f the Moroccan conques t of Santa Cruz , sec Weston F . Cook, The Hundred
Years War for Morocco: Gunpowder and the Military Revolution in ihe Early Modern Muslim World
(Boulder: Westview Press. 1994), 194-200.
'" Cook , Htmdred Years War for Morocco. 218-224 ; Hess . The Forgotten Frontier. 76-78; Dahir u
Yahya, Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in African Foreign Policy (Bristol :
Longman Group. 1981). 11-17.
" Cook . Hundred Years War for Morocco. 241-55: E.W. Bovill , The Battle of Alcazar: An Account of
the Defeat of Don Sebastian of Portugal at El-Ksar el-Kebir (London: Batchworth, 1952) ; Pierre Benhier . La
Bataille de I oued cl-Makhazen dite Bataille des Trois Rois (4 Août 1578) (Paris: Editions du Centre Nationa l
de la Recherche Scientifique . 1985) .
al-Mansur's claim to greatness depended largel y upon the degree to which he could expand
the borders of his state. With the doors for eonquest to the north and east slammed shu t by
the Spaniards and the Ottomans, the sultan's only option for expansion lay to the south.
At th e tim e o f al-Mansur' s ascensio n t o power . Wes t Afric a wa s divide d amon g
several sub-Sahara n Musli m states , includin g th e Songhay , th e Kanem , th e Bornu . th e
Mossi, th e Hausa . an d th e Dendi . Ma p 1  shows th e location s o f thes e state s relativ e t o
Morocco.'2 Th e Songha y wa s th e mos t powerfu l o f thes e dynastie s an d rule d a  territory
directly southeas t o f Morocco . A prosperous gold trade , which ha d it s source i n Songha y
lands, had been carried on throughout northwes t Afric a fo r centuries.' ^ The desire t o gain
control o f thi s resourc e ha d bee n a  ke y facto r motivatin g th e Portugues e incursion s int o
southern Morocco , and many historians assume that this same desire was the driving forc e
behind al-Mansur's forays into the region.
Reviving the Caliphate
Rather tha n simpl y assum e tha t al-Mansu f ha d the same goal s a s the Portuguese, i t
behooves us to consider his actions from withi n an Islamic context. Mulay Ahmad claimed
the titl e o f caliph , a  positio n whos e origin s dat e bac k t o th e earlies t year s o f Islami c
history. Th e origina l caliph s wer e believe d t o be successor s o f th e Prophe t Muhammad .
Their positio n initiall y involve d bot h spiritua l an d politica l leadershi p ove r th e entir e
Muslim eommunity, as is reflected i n the title "Commander of the Faithful."'"^ Particularl y
critical t o the political legitimac y ofth e earl y caliphs wa s their association wit h the house
of th e Prophet , thei r clai m t o uphold th e practice s o f th e tru e faith , an d thei r successfu l
expansion and defense o f Islamic realms through military might.'-'^
However, th e caliph s eventuall y los t bot h thei r religiou s authorit y an d politica l
control ove r Islami c lands . B y th e tent h century , regiona l sultan s hel d th e rea l politica l
power and religious authority wa s in the hands of the idama (council of learned men) . No
serious attempt s wer e mad e t o revive calipha l authorit y alon g it s original line s unti l th e
sixteenth century . Afte r conquerin g Ara b land s i n th e earl y par t o f tha t eentury . th e
Ottoman dynasty bega n to lay claim to the title of caliph, in order to legitimize it s primary
position i n the Islamic world. However, the Ottomans were at a disadvantage i n this, since
they could no t claim sharifia n descent , and they soo n abandoned th e projeet. O n the other
hand, Ahma d al-Mansu r ha d arise n fro m a  famil y tha t wa s widel y believe d t o hav e
descended fro m th e Prophet . Thus , shortl y afte r becomin g sultan . al-Mansu r bega n t o
' - Th e area ruled b y these dynasties was referred t o as the Sudan, a term derived from th e Arabic wor d
for "black. " Thus th e titl e "Sudan" ha d a  much broade r connotation tha n it s modem referenc e t o a  specifi c
country in northeastern Africa .
'^ Fo r a thorough discussion of this trade, see Bovill , The Golden Trade ofthe Moors.
'"* For a  thoroug h discussio n o f th e origina l meanin g o f th e titl e o f caliph , se c Patrici a Cron e an d
Martin Hinds . God's Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of ¡slam (Cambridge : Cambridg e
University Press . 1986).
'- Qualification s fo r th e caliphate wer e summe d u p succinctly b y th e eleventh centur y jurist , Al i ibn
Muhammad al-Mawardi . Fo r at i Englis h translatio n o f hi s discussio n o f calipha l governance , se e Abu'l -
Hasan "A H ib n Muhamma d ib n Habi b al-Basr i al-Baghdad i al-Maward i (d . 45 0 AH) , Al-Ahkam as-
Sullaniyyuh - The Liiws »/¡slaniic Governance, trans. Asadullah Yat e (London: Ta-Ha, 1996) .
openly assert that his catiphal claims better fit th e historic qualifications fo r the position of
"Commander of the Faithful" than did those of the Ottomans. '^
o 2Se 50 0 7 M
Map 1 . Nort h Afric a an d th e Sudan . Source : Lansin e Kaba . "Arcbers . Musketeers , an d
Mosquitoes: Th e Morocca n Invasio n o f th e Suda n an d th e Songha y Resistanc e (1591-1612), "
Journal of African History 22,4(1981), 457-475. Cambridge University i*ress . Used by permissioti.
It wa s i n thi s rol e a s th e rightfu l calip h ove r th e Islami c worl d tha t al-Mansu r
approached the Muslim rulers of the kingdoms south of the Sahara. In letters written to the
rulers o f Bornu . Kebbi . an d Songhay , al-Mansu r asserte d hi s ealipha l supremac y an d
maintained tha t he was only attempting to restore Islamic unity as God intended , under the
rightful leadershi p o f th e famil y o f th e Prophet . Th e sultan' s letter s t o th e sub-Sahara n
monarehs emphasized tha t he needed thei r suppor t t o stem the progress of the unbelievin g
Europeans, and to fulfill hi s role as leader of holy war to advance the expansion of Islam.'^
'** For information o n th e Ottoma n us e o f th e dtl e o f caliph , se e the followin g works : H.A.R . Gibb ,
"Lufti Pash a on the Ottoman Caliphate. " Oriens 1 5 (1962), 287-95: Colin Imber , "Siileymân a s Caliph of the
Muslims: Ebû's-Su'ùd' s Formulatio n o f Ottoma n Dynasti c ideology, " i n Gille s Veinstein , ed. . Soliman le
Magnifique et son Temps (Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales , 1992) , 179-84; Colin Imber ,
"Ideals and Legitimatio n i n Early Ottoman History. " in Metin Kun t and Christin e Woodhead, eds., Suleynum
the Magnificent and His Af-e: The Ouoman Empire in the Early Modern World (London: Longman . 1995) ,
138-53; Chantai de la Vcronne. "Relations entr e l e Maroc et la Turquie dans l a seconde moitié du XVI et le
XVll siècle (1554-1616),'" Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée 1.5-16 (1973), 391^01 .
'^ Severa l o f thes e letter s hav e bee n translate d int o Englis h an d ca n b e foun d i n Hunwick . Timbuktu
and ihe Songhay Empire. 292-308. Others appear i n their original Arabi e i n " Abd Alla h Gannun, Rasa 'il al-
Sa'diyya (Titwän, Morocco: Ma'had MQlay i al-Hasan, 1954) .
The clear implication o f his message wa s that, as members of Dar al-Islam (the House of
Islam), th e sub-Sahara n African s shoul d willingl y submi t t o al-Mansu r a s th e rightful
caliph over all Muslims. Submission woul d bring blessing and prosperity, while resistance
would bring destruction.
The Sa'di sultan appears to have envisioned a  caliphate that woul d span the Sahara
on both sides , and woul d serv e a s a challenge t o Ottoman supremacy . Althoug h thi s idea
seems far-fetche d t o u s now , livin g a s w e d o i n th e ag e o f nationalis m an d self -
determination. al-Mansur' s approac h wa s i n accordanc e wit h histori c Islami c ideology .
The Umayya d an d Abbasi d caliphate s ha d manage d t o hol d togethe r vas t empires ,
spanning larg e territories tha t toda y encompas s a  number of separat e national entitie s and
peoples o f differen t ethnicities . Durin g th e tim e o f al-Mansur . th e Ottoma n Empir e als o
brought togethe r man y differen t region s unde r on e head , while , superficiall y a t least ,
applying the title of caliph t o their sultan . Al-Mansur ha d no reason t o think tha t h e could
not d o th e same , especially sinc e hi s claims fo r leadershi p wer e bette r tha n thos e o f th e
Ottomans. I n addition , long-standin g economi c an d religiou s connection s betwee n Nort h
and West Afric a encourage d th e sultan t o conceive o f thes e two areas as one community ,
which ought to be linked politically a s well. '^ He argued that , as a sharif, he was uniquely
qualified t o lea d thi s community , an d tha t th e ruler s o f th e sub-Sahara n Islami c state s
should recognize and submit to his authority.
Windows into the Past
Just becaus e al-Mansu r claime d th e caliphate t o justify hi s invasion doesn' t mea n tha t h e
wasn't manipulatin g ideolog y t o suppor t thef t o f Songha y gold . I n fact , a  numbe r o f
historians hav e accuse d hi m o f doin g just that . In order t o properly evaluat e th e sultan' s
motives, we must consider the contemporary historica l source s for the Moroccan conques t
of Songhay . Th e mos t importan t Morocca n accoun t wa s writte n b y th e sultan' s scribe ,
'Abd al-'Azi z al-Fishtali. Al-Fishtali's account, Mandhil al-safa'Ji ma 'athir niawâlïml al-
shurafâ' ("Th e Pur e Spring s o f th e Exploit s o f our Lords th e Sharifs") . i s considered a n
apologetic wor k for al-Mansur's reign.' ^ I t describes al-Mansur"s preparations for , and the
events connecte d with , th e Morocca n invasion . I t als o provide s copie s o f contemporar y
documents related to the conquest. Later Moroccan historians such as al-Ifrani, al-Zayyani ,
'^ Althoug h Westerner s hav e ofte n faile d t o recogniz e thes e link s betweet i Nort h Afric a an d sub -
Saharan Africa , thi s menta l barrie r ha s no t alway s existe d i n th e mind s o f Africans . Th e oldes t wrine n
records tha t w e have of sub-Sahara n Afric a ar e almost al l from th e pen s o f Ara b writers . The earlies t Ara b
writers testify t o the virihty ot Maghrib i trade with sub-Saharan Afriea , whic h had been carried on since prior
to th e comin g o f Islam . Th e expansio n o f Isla m withi n th e sub-Sahara n land s durin g th e thirteent h an d
fourteenth centurie s create d anothe r bon d betwee n th e tw o areas . Sub-Sahara n Africa n scholar s kep t
themselves abreas t of intellectua l an d political development s i n suc h nonher n center s as Cairo and Fez , and
those African s wh o wer e fortunat e enoug h t o mak e th e pilgrimag e t o Mecc a passe d throug h th e Maghrib ,
further strengthenin g connections . Sometime s influence s ra n i n the other direction . I n th e eleventh century ,
nomadic tribes from th e southem Sahar a established th e famous Almoravid dynasty , which ruled th e western
Maghrib and al-Andalus for over one hundred years.
'^ Abu Paris Ab d a\-' /^7Íza\'V\ú\Vd\\. Munähil al-safâ' ß ma'athirmawatTnä al-shurafa'. ed . "Abd al-
Karim Kurayyim (1973: reprint. Casablanca: Matba'a t al-Najah al-Jadîda , 200.*)).
and al-Nasir i largel y dre w thei r informatio n abou t th e invasio n fro m th e accoun t o f al -
The proble m wit h al-Fishtali' s tex t i s tha t i t i s elearly a  panegyri e source , whie h
was writte n wit h th e ai m o f glorifyin g th e regim e o f Ahma d al-Mansur . AI-Fishtal i
frequently make s statements that appear to be exaggerated o r even fabricated . Hi s account
is writte n i n a n extremel y eomple x literar y styl e know n a s insha\ whie h wa s use d t o
produce officia l document s i n pre-moder n Ara b courts.2 ' Fo r thes e reasons , man y
historians hav e completel y avoide d dealin g wit h al-Fishtali , preferrin g t o us e th e mor e
orderly presentatio n foun d i n th e eighteenth-centur y histor y o f al-Ifrani . Nevertheless ,
there is no escaping the fact tha t the sultan's scribe was the nearest contempiirary source to
al-Mansur, an d thus the most likel y to understand hi s master's purposes i n undertaking an
assault upo n th e Songhay . I n orde r t o full y explai n th e Morocca n invasion , w e mus t
consider the text of al-Fishtali.
The earlies t accoun t fro m a  Wes t Africa n perspeetiv e i s Tankh al-Fattash
("Chronicle o f the Researcher"), which is usually attribute d t o Mahmud al-Ka'ti , a scholar
of Timbuktu wh o died i n 1593.^ 2 Al-Ka'ti wa s mainly intereste d i n describing th e impact
of th e invasio n upo n Wes t Afrie a an d h e says ver y littl e abou t al-Mansur . Anothe r earl y
account from a  West African perspectiv e i s Ta'nkh al-Südän ("History o f the Sudan"), by
Abdarrahman al-S a di.^ -"* Written i n the late seventeent h century , aI-Sa"di' s work i s based
upon contemporar y sources . Hi s tex t provide s a n extensiv e accoun t o f th e Morocca n
invasion, includin g numerou s comment s abou t th e Saudi s an d al-Mansur . H e discusse s
events leadin g u p t o th e invasio n an d report s correspondenc e betwee n al-Mansu r an d
several Songha y ruler s (Askias) over a fifteen-year period . Some of al-Sa'di's details seem
to contradict al-Fishtal i an d thu s modem historian s us e his text t o impugn th e veracity o f
al-Mansur's scribe.
Various othe r document s als o she d ligh t upo n thi s controversia l conquest . Thes e
include account s b y Europea n observers , suc h a s English , Spanish , o r Portugues e
^" Al-lfrani , Muhamma d al-Saghî r ib n al-Hajj , Nuzhat al-hûdT hi akhhär miiluk al-qarn al-hâdT. ed .
"Abd al-Latî f al-Sh:ldhil T (Casablanca: Matba'a t al-NajS h al-Jadîda , 1998) . ed. i n Arabi c an d Frenc h trans .
Octave Houdas, Nozhet-Elhadi: Histoire de la dynastic Saadienne (1511-1670) (Paris : Leroux. 1888-1889) ;
Al-Zayyänl, Abu al-Qäsim Ahma d ibn AI T ibn Ibrâhîm, Al-Turjumm al-Mu'rihan duwal al-Mashriq waal-
Maghrih, trans. Octave Houdas. Le Maroc de ¡631 à 1812 (Paris: E. Laroux, 1886) . The Sa'dl sectio n of this
work ha s been edited an d translate d b y Roge r L e Tourneau a s 'Histoire de l a Dynastie Sa'adide" , Revue de
l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée 23 (1977), 1-107 ; Al-NâsirT. Ahmad bi n Khulid , A'f/â/ j al-istiqsâ
li-akhhür duwal al-Maghrib al-aqs^, vols . 3-7, eds . Muhamma d Hajjî , Ibruhï m Bütälib , Ahma d al-Tawfr q
(Casablanca: Matba"a t al-Najâ h al-Jadîda . 2001) . Th e Sa'd i sectio n o f Nasiri' s tex t wa s translate d int o
French by Mohammad al-Nasir i i n Archives Marocaines 34 (Paris: E. Leroux, 1936).
^' Thi s forma l styl e o f writin g ha d bee n popula r i n Musli m chancellerie s sinc e th e Abbasi d era . Fo r
more on al-Mansur" s us e of insha' literature , see Stephe n Cory , "Language o f Power : Th e Us e of Literar y
Arabic as Political Propaganda i n Early Mode m Moroeeo. " The Maghreb Review 30, I  (2005).
^^ Muhamma d K . al-Ka"ti , TarTkh al-Fattash. ed . an d trans . Octave Houda s an d Mauric e Delafosse ,
(Paris: Adrienne-Maisonnueve, 1913) .
^^ For an English translation of al-Sa'di, see Hunwick, Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire.
businessmen or officials wh o were in Morocco around the time of the invasion.^ ** Some of
them witnessed al-Mansur's preparations for war, while others observed caravans returning
to Marrakesh . lade n wit h prize s claime d fro m Wes t Africa , followin g th e conques t o f
Songhay. Th e enthusiasti c description s o f thes e eyewitnesse s largel y contribute d t o
European impression s o f th e sultan' s grea t wealt h an d hi s acquisitiv e motive s fo r th e
invasion. Yet, for the most part, these Europeans viewed the conquest from th e outside and
their impressions ofthe sultan' s motives were not gained from interactio n wit h al-Mansu r
himself.
Finally, there i s a considerable amoun t o f roya l correspondence tha t remain s fro m
al-Mansur's regime . This includes letters addressed t o the Songhay Askia s and other sub-
Saharan ruler s o r notables , letter s addresse d t o Moroccan s involve d wit h th e invasion ,
letters t o Europea n o r Musli m court s tha t refe r t o th e invasion , an d officia l
pronouncements mean t t o be read fro m th e pulpits of the mosques i n cities such as Fez or
in the region of the Sus.-"^ Produced b y al-Mansur's court , these letter s supply th e officia l
explanation fo r th e attack . Unfortunately , ther e ar e n o privat e memoir s fro m Morocca n
officials t o provide "a n insid e look " behind th e scenes . Such documentation i s extremely
rare i n th e pre-moder n Islami c world , whic h considere d privat e revelation s a s shamefu l
and inappropriate literar y topics.
Altogether, thes e source s provid e th e onl y window s throug h whic h w e ca n loo k
back into the sixteenth century in order to understand th e reasons for the Sa'di invasio n of
Songhay. Mos t moder n historian s bas e thei r analyse s o n th e Europea n o r Wes t Africa n
sources an d o n al-Ifrani' s truncate d versio n o f Fishtali' s account ; Almos t withou t
exception, thes e writer s hav e assume d tha t al-Mansur' s aim s i n attackin g Songha y wer e
primarily fo r materia l gain . Only Dahir u Yahya . 'Abd al-Kari m Kurayyim . and Mercede s
Garcia Arena l giv e seriou s attentio n t o the sultan' s avowe d religiou s motivation s fo r th e
invasion.2 '^ The genera l lac k o f interes t i n al-Mansur' s calipha l aspiration s stem s fro m a
twentieth-century bia s toward s materialis t explanations , whic h fail s t o giv e adequat e
consideration t o sixteenth-centur y realities . Thi s approac h ca n b e summarize d i n th e
following quote by the French historian Felix Dubois:
2^ Most of these ar e foun d i n the mammoth collectio n o f document s assemble d b y Henr y d e Castrie s
and associates . See Henry dc Castries. Pierre de Cenival . Robert Ricard , Chantal d e la Véronne, and Philip p
de Cosse Brissac . eds.. Les sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc de 1530 ¿i 1845. Première série , dynastie
saadienne (1530-1660) (Paris : E. Leroux, \90b-2X Archives et bibliothèques de Angleterre. 3 vols. (Ijindon
and Paris : E . Leroux . 1918-1936) ; Archives et bibliothèques de France. 3  vols . (Paris : E . Leroux . 1905 -
1911); Archives et bibliothèques de Pays-bas. 6 vois. (Paris and the Hague: E. Leroux. 1906-1923) : Archives
et bibliothèques de Portugal. 5 vols. (Paris: P. Geuthner. 1934-1953) ; Archives et bibliothèques de Espagne,
3 vols. (Paris: E. Leroux. 1921-1961) .
^- Thi s correspondenc e ca n b e found i n th e followin g sources : Hunwick . Timbuktu and the Songhay
Empire: al-Fishtali. Manûhilal-safâ': Gannun . Rasa'ilal-Sa'diyya.
-° Yahya . Morocco in the Sixteenth Century. 145-67 ; Abd al-Karim Kurayyim . At-Maghrihfi ahd al-
dawla al-Sa'diyya (Casablanca ; Sharika t al-Taba " w a al-Nashr . 1978) , 143-73 ; Mercede s Garci a Arena! .
Messiatiism and Puritanical Reform: Mahdis ofthe Muslim Wesi. tratis. Martin Beagle s (Leiden: Brill . 2006).
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So many attractions gathered togethe r under one sky (in West Afriea) eoul d no t fail
to rouse the attention, and by-and-by th e cupidity, o f neighboring territories . Chief
among these was naturally tha t country neares t the Sudan. Moroceo. From the first
their avariée assume d a  harshly definit e character , fo r th e people o f Morocc o had
not, and never did have , any desir e to colonize and develop a eommerce, nor even
to institut e a  religiou s propaganda . The y looke d upo n th e Sudan i n th e ligh t o f a
gold mine , and thei r first aspirations, lik e their ultimate efforts , wer e concentrated
upon the mere drainage of this precious metal.^ ^
The followin g analysi s take s a  differen t approac h fro m th e conventiona l vie w
expressed above . Sinc e al-Fishtal i generall y ha d a  good reputatio n fo r reliabilit y amon g
pre-modem Morocca n historians , an d sine e h e i s clearly th e closes t remainin g historica l
source t o al-Mansur himself , I  give preferenc e t o his account an d t o the Morocca n roya l
correspondence, takin g int o consideratio n th e writing s o f al-Sa'd i an d th e Europea n
sources. I consider the European account s to be least helpful fo r my purposes, due to their
lack of aeeess to the Moroccan eourt and their ignorance of the political and cultural milieu
within whic h al-Mansu r operated . A s 1 will show , an analysi s tha t preferenee s Morocca n
sources yields a very different conclusio n from tha t of Dubois.
Peripheral Negotiations ?
Part o f th e criticism o f ManafiH al-safâ' stem s from al-Fishtali' s seemin g obsessio n wit h
negotiations tha t moder n historian s vie w a s periphera l t o th e mai n storyline . Afte r
deseribing al-Mansur' s conques t o f tw o deser t oase s alon g th e Sahara n carava n rout e
{Tuwat an d Gurara) , Manahil al-safa' devote s a  considerabl e amoun t o f spac e t o
discussing th e sultan' s dealing s wit h a  prominen t sub-Sahara n Africa n ruler . Ma i Idri s
Aloma o f th e Bornu . Mos t mtxler n historian s sho w littl e interes t i n al-Fishtali' s
preoccupation wit h these negotiations. Dahiru Yahya even asserts that the Sa'di historian is
untrustworthy i n hi s descriptio n o f th e Moroccan-Bom o diplomati c activity.-* * Thus, i t i s
important t o examine this portion of Manahil al-safa' sinc e it touches upon the question of
al-Fishtali's reliabilit y a s a  source. The followin g analysi s eonsiders hi s aeeoun t o f these
negotiations in light of modem historical interpretations.
The Borno dynasty had its capital in the city of Ngazargamu on the banks ofthe Y o
River, near what i s now the border between th e modern state s of Niger and Nigeria . Mor e
information abou t Ma i Idri s exists tha n fo r an y othe r Born o rule r prio r t o the nineteent h
century, due to the survival of Ibn Fartuwa' s panegyric chronicle for the first twelv e years
of Mai Idris " reign.^ '^ John Hunwic k summarize s Ibn Fartuwa's aeeount a s presenting "the
picture of a  vigorous rule r who embarked on a  planned polic y of securing his borders and
pacifying hi s own domains."'" The pursuit of this enterprise brought Idris into contact with
^' Feli x Dubois , Timbuctoo, the Mysterious, trans. Diana White (New York ; Negro Universitie s Press ,
1969). 122.
^" Yahya. Morocco in the Sixteenth Century, 150.
-^ Ahmad b. Fartuwa, The Kanem Wars, trans. H.R. Palmer in Sudanese Memoirs (Lagos: Government
publication. 1928) , 1: 15-8 L Also trans, by J.W. Rcdhau^cJ. Royal A.fiatic Society.\o\. 1 9 (1862). 42-123.
•'* John Hunwick , "Songhay . Born u an d Hausalan d i n th e Sixteent h Century, " i n J.F.A . Ajay i an d
Michael Crowder, eds.. History of West Africa (Cambridge: Columbia Universit y Press, 1972) , 1: 208.
the superpowe r the n exertin g it s influenc e throughou t Northeaster n Africa , th e Ottoma n
Empire. Idris initially attempted t o reach a  formal agreemen t wit h the Ottomans to protect
his sovereignty. When these negotiations broke down, the Bomo ruler turned hi s attention
to the other North African power , the Sa di state in Moroceo.
It was evidently th e Bornu who took the initia l step in this relationship. Al-Fishtal i
writes, "in th e year 990 (1582 CE) al-Mansu r receive d news , while he was in the city of
Fez, o f th e approac h o f th e messenge r o f th e maste r o f th e kingdo m o f Bornu."' "
Apparently th e messenge r brough t wit h hi m a  larg e delegation , includin g a  sizeabl e gif t
"of wha t wa s current amon g their customs t o bring, ( a gift) o f youthfu l mal e and femal e
slaves and sub-Sahara n clothin g an d euriosities."-^ - ^ The chronicler goe s on to describe al -
Mansur's meetin g wit h thi s convocation o n a  large plain i n the Fez area. The purpos e of
this visi t wa s "t o as k th e assistane e o f th e Commande r o f th e Faithful , o f armie s an d
warriors and a  number o f musket s an d eannon s t o battl e thos e unbeliever s wh o bordere d
(the Bornu ) o n th e fa r sid e o f th e Sudan."^ " * However , a  proble m aros e i n thi s initia l
meeting, which al-Mansu r woul d us e to his advantage i n his negotiations wit h the Bornu .
"When (Idri s Aloma's) lette r was read t o the Commander o f the Faithful , ther e happened
to be a di.screpancy between i t and the words of the messenger.... S o al-Mansur seized the
opportunity because of the difference betwee n the messenger and the letter and he held this
against the master of the kingdom of Bornu."^ "^
Sending the messenger back to Idris Aloma (with the appropriate gifts) , al-Mansu r
stipulated som e condition s unde r whic h h e woul d provid e th e requeste d aid . "H e
demanded th e oat h (o f allegiance ) fro m the m an d (required ) tha t the y ente r int o hi s
prophetic summons , which Gtxl impose d upo n the m an d upo n al l th e worshipper s i n th e
regions of the countries that were submitting to it.... (An d he communicated t o them) that
the holy war, for which they expressed an inclination and a desire, could no t be fulfilled .. .
as long as they had not sought permission i n their affairs fro m th e Imam of the community
(al-Mansur), whom God had distinguished a s Commander of the Faithful i n his role as the
provider fo r thi s community, the inherito r of the legacy o f th e prophecy." -^^ Accordin g to
al-Fishtali, th e Born o messenge r too k thi s oath . Th e scrib e include s a  copy o f th e text ,
which he wrote out and sent back with the messenger to Idris Aloma.
Al-Fishtali appear s to have viewed thi s sequence of events as significant, devotin g
over seve n page s t o describin g th e negotiations . I t .seem s tha t al-Mansu r wa. s hoping t o
utilize hi s allianc e wit h th e Born u a s a  stepping-ston e i n hi s attempt s t o contro l th e
Songhay. The Bornu must have understood this , for the messenger, in his initial addres s to
the Sa'd i sultan , "compare d (hi s request ) t o th e event s i n whic h th e Commande r o f th e
Faithful ha d directe d hi s armie s fo r th e regiona l conques t o f Tuwa t an d Gurara , an d h e
Al-Fishtali, Manahil al-safa '. 67. All translations from al-Fishtali' s text are mine.
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hoped tha t (al-Mansur ) woul d mak e th e tw o o f the m (Bom u an d Tuwat/Gurara ) int o
stirrups for the conquest of the country of the Sudan and capturing its kingdoms."^*'
The main probie m wit h thi s account i s that i t does not fi t wit h subsequen t events .
There is no indication anywher e that al-Mansur provide d th e military ai d that Idri s Aloma
asked o f him . Indeed , given hi s planned assaul t upo n th e Songhay , i t i s doubtful tha t the
sultan woul d hav e ha d th e resource s t o devot e t o suc h a n allianc e wit h th e Bornu . An d
there i s also n o recor d tha t th e Bom u aide d th e Moroccan s i n any wa y whe n al-Mansu r
later launched hi s offensive agains t the Songhay capita l in Gao. Indeed, there i s no furthe r
mention anywhere of this supposed alliance, a fact tha t seems very strange given the strong
language in which the agreement was couched.
Yahya view s thes e fact s a s evidence o f al-Fishtali' s unreliability . H e laments that
"our knowledg e of the workings of Born u diplomacy i s severely limite d b y the one-sided
nature o f ou r documents , i.e. , Osmanl i an d Sa'di , ther e bein g n o Bornoa n officia l
documents excep t fo r som e brief reference s b y Ibn Fartuwa."^ " ^ Yahya' s interpretatio n i s
filled wit h unfavorabl e allusion s t o th e Morocca n sultan , suc h a s hi s statemen t tha t
"Moroccan officia l source s grudgingly admit tha t th e motiv e behin d th e Born u embass y
was Idri s Aloma' s wis h t o acquir e arm s fro m Mortx:c o an d th e us e o f som e sharifia n
soldiers t o hel p wag e jihad agains t th e idol-worshipper s i n th e Sudan." '^ ^ Yahy a finds  i t
unlikely tha t al-Mansur could have delivered upo n a promise of military aid to the Bornu.
However, "t o admi t al l thi s t o th e embass y woul d hav e bee n bot h undiplomati c an d
harmful t o the image of Morocco.'"-'*'^ Thus, al-Mansur drew out the negotiations in order to
buy time , neve r intendin g t o hono r th e request . Beyon d this , Yahy a doubt s tha t Idri s
Aloma woul d eve r agre e t o accep t "th e spiritua l supremac y o f Morocc o b y recognizin g
Ahmad al-Mansur as the only caliph and Imam of Islam."'*" He questions the credibility of
the Moroccan records, claiming.
There seem s t o b e som e factua l erro r o r a t leas t discrepanc y i n al-Fishtali' s
accounts. Th e statemen t tha t th e secon d embass y brough t bac k th e draf t o f 'th e
Blessed Bay'ah of the ruler of the Bornu' (the oath of allegiance) cannot be correct.
The secon d envo y (a s anothe r o f al-Fishtali' s passage s ha s it ) cam e wit h th e
clarification o f Bornu's demands, and only after thi s was he told that recognition of
the spiritual suzerainty of Morocco was a condition for any military aid.' "
Another of Yahya's criticisms of al-Fishtali i s based upon the scribe's claim that he
himself wrot e the oath of allegiance tha i wa s agreed t o by Idri s Aloma. Yahy a state s that
the authenticity of the oath i s brought int o question b y al-Fishtaii's admission tha t th e text
was not written i n Bomo. The Sa~di scribe claimed t o have written i t himself becaus e the
people of Bornu did not have a good grasp of Arabic and were generally ignorant, "a claim
^^ Ibid.
^' Yahya , Morocco in the Sixteenth Century. 147.
- ** Ibid. . 148 , emphasis mine . In my reading of al-Fishta]i . I fail t o notice the "grudging" nattire of this
admission.
^^ Ibid., 148.
*"lbid.. I5U .
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which was of course baseless. The reputation of Borno scholarship was weil established... .
The text of the bay'ah reflecte d th e nature of Morocco' s foreig n polic y problem s an d the
theologically-based politica l argument s use d b y Morocco' s propagand a i n th e Islami c
world."''2 Yahya goes on to conclude that "Morocean-Bomo diplomatic relations were thus
inconclusive.... Shari f Ahma d al-Mansu r ha d apparentl y go t som e illusor y satisfactio n
from th e negotiations, but nothing else came out of them.'"^^
However, i t i s not necessary t o interpret al-Fishtali' s narrativ e from suc h a cynical
perspective. Fo r instance , Hunwick accept s the basic outlines o f Fishtali' s accoun t o f th e
negotiations wit h Bornu . H e interprets th e Bom o reques t a s havin g bee n motivate d b y a
fear o f th e Ottoman s an d suggest s tha t thi s coul d hav e accounte d fo r th e "marke d
discrepancy betwee n th e content s o f th e lette r an d th e representation s o f th e
ambassador."*^ Hunwic k see s th e agreemen t a s havin g immens e potentia l valu e t o al -
Mansur, writin g that , "Firstly , i t woul d provid e hi m wit h importan t suppor t i n hi s
challenge t o th e Ottoma n sulta n fo r recognitio n a s suprem e hea d o f th e Musli m
community, in Africa a t least. Secondly, it would secur e the submission of one of the great
empires of the Sudan, leaving him with only the Songhay to subdue—a plan which wa s no
doubt alread y i n hi s mind."'^ -' ' Bu t somethin g wen t awry . Hunwic k speculate s tha t al -
Mansur wa s unable t o fulfil l hi s promis e o f militar y ai d due t o hi s other obligation s an d
that consequently "n o appeal for suppor t was made to Bornu by al-Mansur when his forces
were engaged i n subduing Songhay during the last decade of the century.'"^^
Indeed, th e discrepanc y i n al-Fishtali' s tex t t o whic h Yahy a allude s i s no t
immediately apparen t upo n a  readin g o f Manähil al-safâ.' Th e critica l statemen t wit h
which Yahya takes issue (that the second emissary brough t back to al-Mansur a copy of the
bay'ah) doe s no t appea r i n al-Fishtali' s account . Yahy a inexplicabl y fail s t o includ e a
reference fo r thi s statement , eve n thoug h h e i s ver y detaile d i n hi s reference s i n othe r
places. I n addition , th e theologica l debat e tha t Yahy a accuse s al-Mansu r o f engagin g i n
with the emissary doe s no t appear i n the text . As fo r whethe r i t i s realistic t o assume tha t
the Bomo ruler would submit to taking an oath of allegiance to al-Mansur. Hunwick write s
"Bomu, fo r it s part , wa s apparentl y willin g t o pa y th e pric e al-Mansu r demanded ,
assuming n o doubt tha t Moroeeo wa s too distant fo r allegianc e to its ruler to be anythin g
more than a formality.""*^
Finally, whil e Yahy a ma y hav e conclusiv e evidenc e tha t th e clai m o f Bom o
ignorance wa s false , i t i s questionabl e whethe r al-Fishtal i woul d hav e ha d sufficientl y
detailed knowledg e o f th e Bornu t o verify whethe r or no t this ignorance existed . The text
reports tha t th e excuse o f Bom o ignorance wa s give n b y th e messenge r t o al-Mansu r a s
justification fo r hi s reques t tha t th e Moroecan s dra w u p the d(x:ument o f th e oath . I f th e
claim was untrue, it seems that the fault lie s with the emissary from Bom u and not with al-
|bid.. 150 .
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Fishtali. Idris Aloma evidently had some reason for wanting the Moroccans to draw up this
document, possibly so that he could distance himself fro m i t if the agreement fel l apart and
the Ottoman s chos e t o tak e issu e wit h it . Yahya' s portraya l o f Ma i Idri s a s a n inntKen t
victim o f al-Mansur' s machination s seem s somewha t far-fetched . I t i s muc h mor e likel y
that eac h o f th e tw o sultan s wa s attemptin g t o manipulat e th e situatio n t o hi s ow n
perceived advantage . I n addition , al-Fishtal i wa s n o doubt influence d b y a  longstandin g
Maghribi belief in the backwardness of sub-Saharan Africa , a  belief tha t was expressed by
Ibn Battuta two hundred years earlier.'^ **
To assert tha t al-Fishtali' s accoun t i s unreliable simpl y because i t seek s to portray
al-Mansur i n th e mos t favorabl e ligh t i s unconvincing . T o furthe r alleg e tha t al-Mansu r
engaged i n thes e negotiation s ou t o f som e desir e fo r "a n illusor y satisfaction. " o r self -
gratification, underestimate s th e actua l advantage s o f increase d prestig e tha t th e sulta n
could potentiall y hav e gaine d fro m suc h a n alliance . B y securin g th e submissio n o f th e
Bomu an d th e Songhay, al-Mansu r woul d hav e strengthened hi s han d significantl y i n hi s
competition wit h the Ottomans. Although th e alliance betwee n Morocc o and Bom u faile d
to materializ e i n subsequen t events , thi s doe s no t indicat e tha t al-Fishtal i invente d th e
entire account.
Illegal Assault ?
Having complete d hi s negotiation s wit h th e Born u a s wel l a s hi s invasio n o f Tuwat an d
Gurara, al-Mansur now turned his attention directly towards the Askia and the Songhay. In
a letter to Askia Ishaq II , al-Mansur demanded that the Songhay ruler pay the Morix:cans a
tax equaling a mithqaH'^ of gold for every load of salt taken from th e Songhay sal t mines at
Taghaza. The sultan claimed tha t hi s purpose for the tax was to "spend wha t accrues fro m
this .. . i n pursui t o f campaignin g an d jihad."''" Indeed , i t wa s th e Morocca n armies , al -
Mansur insisted , tha t protecte d th e Songha y fro m bein g overwhelme d b y th e force s o f
European unbelievers . "They are the armies of God." wrote al-Mansur. "Were I t not for the
fact tha t thei r shar p sword s for m a  barrie r betwee n yo u an d th e infide l tyrant s .. . (th e
infidels') flowin g torrent s woul d inundat e you .. . an d flood you r land."-'' ' Ye t these same
Moroccan armie s wer e t o b e unleashe d upo n th e Songha y Empire , whic h the y wer e
supposedly protecting , shortl y afte r thi s lette r wa s written . Throug h a  strang e twis t o f
logic, th e sulta n argue d tha t hi s calipha l responsibilit y fo r th e defens e o f Islami c land s
justified a  bloody attack against a Muslim prince who refused t o recognize his authority.
In describing this sequence of events, al-Fishtali emphasizes that al-Mansur did not
send off his letter in a hasty fashion. On the contrary, "he did not exchange correspondence
"*** N. Levtzio n an d J.F.P . Hopkins , eds. . Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History
(Princeton: Marku s Weine r Publishers . 2000) , 279-304 . Fo r a  translation o f Ib n Battuta' s accoun t o f sub -
Saharan Africa , se e Sai d Hamdu n an d Noe l King , ¡bn Battuta in Black Africa (Princeton : Marku s Weine r
Publishers, 2005).
^^ Equa l t o a  dina r o f pur e gold , th e equivalen t o f 4.2 5 gm . Hunwick . Timbuktu and the Songhay
Empire, ]42,2m,m.2Se>.
^^ "Lette r fro m Mula y Ahma d al-Mansu r t o Askiy a Isha q I L date d Safa r 998/Decembe r 1589, "
Hunwick. Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire, 295.
^' Hunwick , Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire, 295.
with hi m o n thi s unti l h e ha d aske d th e ulama of hi s province fo r a  lega l opinio n .. . o f
it."^^ H e then adds , "So the y gav e hi m a  lega l opinio n .. . tha t th e eontro l o f th e mine s
belongs unconditionally an d solely to the Imam (al-Mansur) , and that i t was not for anyone
to have any authority i n this matter except by permission o f the sultan or his deputies. And
al-Mansur sen t thos e fatwa-s, (t o Ishaq) , alon g wit h th e lette r direete d t o him . wit h th e
messenger."-''3 When Isha q delaye d i n respondin g t o the letter , al-Mansu r interprete d th e
delay a s a  refusal t o submi t t o the command , an d h e "becam e furious . S o he decide d t o
send his soldiers to the Sudan. And this was the basis for (his decision) to go towards these
lands and to subjugate them."'^ "*
In ligh t o f al-Mansur's clear determination t o conquer the kingdom o f Songhay . it
is not surprising that the ulama went along with his request and provided lega l justification
for hi s move agains t th e Wes t Africa n state . What i s more unexpected i s that , withi n th e
ranks o f th e Morocca n notables , ther e seem s t o have bee n som e dissent expresse d abou t
the idea of military action agains l Songhay . Al-Fishtali describes the sultan's meeting with
"his commanders .. . an d the notables of his kingdom an d .. . th e men of judgment."^'' Al -
Mansur ha d apparentl y ealle d thi s meetin g t o gai n a  rubber-stam p approva l fo r hi s
invasion. However , he was in for a  surprise. After detailing hi s reasons for the expedition.
al-Mansur noticed tha t "those who were present fel l silen t and did not ask anything. So he
said t o them 'Ar e yo u silen t i n approva l o f m y opinion o r i s there a  difference betwee n
your view of th e situation an d mine?'"-'^ ^ The notables described thei r reservations, which
included th e difficulty o f launchin g a n offensive acros s the deser t wastelan d an d th e fac t
that the great Moroccan dynasties ofthe pas t (including the Almoravids, the Aimohads and
the Merinids ) ha d neve r attempte d suc h a  thing. Al-Fishtal i report s tha t th e sulta n easil y
answered thes e objections, pointing to the superiority of the Moroccan weaponry over that
of th e Songhay , th e fac t tha t merchant s routinel y crosse d th e deser t i n safety , an d th e
difference i n th e situation s betwee n th e Sa'd i dynast y an d it s predecessors . Thi s
explanation seem s t o hav e satisfie d th e notables , fo r the y responde d t o al-Mansu r tha t
"(your) answe r wa s effectiv e an d it s eorreetnes s inspire d (us ) s o tha t ther e i s no longe r
anything for anyone to say . There is truth in the saying Th e mind s of kings are the kings
of minds.'"-^ "^
Nobody appear s t o hav e raise d th e issu e o f th e appropriatenes s o f on e Musli m
dynasty invadin g another , eve n thoug h ther e i s clea r evidenc e tha t Songha y wa s a n
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Orthodox Muslim regim e and that the city o f Timbuktu wa s respected i n West Afric a a s a
center o f Musli m scholarship . Hunwiek quote s a  description o f th e city b y al-Ka"ti , who,
he says,
even i f w e allow fo r som e exces s o f parochia l enthusiasm , ha s lef t u s a  glowing
account o f sixteent h centur y Timbuctoo . "Religio n flourishe d an d th e Sunn a
enlivened bot h religious and worldl y affairs... . I n those days i t (Timbuktu) had no
equal i n th e Sudan , fro m Mal i t o th e edge s o f th e Maghrib , fo r soundnes s o f
institutions, politica l liberties , purit y o f eustoms , securit y o f lif e an d goods ,
elemency an d compassion toward s the poor ma n an d the stranger an d respec t for ,
and assistance to, the students and men of learning."''*^
Regarding the reputation of Timbuktu. Elias Saud adds:
Timbuktu wa s the principa l hei r to (the ) legac y whereb y a  whol e tow n woul d b e
identified o n basis of its autonomous leadership as a "city o f scholars" or a "city of
jurists." In a  sense, Timbuktu becam e the main poin t o f convergenc e fo r scholar s
and literat i i n th e region . It s reputatio n a s a  "cit y o f scholars " subsequentl y
overshadowed tha t of other earlier towns and settlements.^^
So, if Songhay was a faithful Musli m dynasty, why i s there no hint of regret in al-Fishtali's
text about the devastation Cha t the Moroccan invasio n wreaked upon them'.' Indeed, no one
seems to hav e challenged al-Mansu r o n thi s poin t excep t th e Wes t Afriea n juris t Ahma d
Baba, who was exiled to Marrakesh from Timbuktu i n the year 1594.^ ^'
Actually, some objections of this type may have been raised earlier, but they do not
appear i n Manahil al-safcV. AI-Sa~d i describe s tw o earlie r expedition s tha t al-Mansu r
apparently sen t t o Wes t Afric a i n th e year s 1584—8 5 and whic h ende d i n failure.^ ' H e
claims that th e second attempte d invasio n le d t o the withdrawa l o f the Songhay fro m th e
salt mines i n Taghaza , leavin g thes e mines to be abandoned . Yahy a report s tha t al-SaM i
indicates
the feelings o f Islami c brotherhood o f the Moroccan me n of religion wer e shocked
not s o mue h b y th e failur e o f th e expedition s a s b y "th e arso n an d murder "
eommitted upo n thei r fello w Muslim s i n th e cours e o f thes e preliminar y
expeditions. These early unsuccessfu l expedition s provide d ground s fo r opposition
to Ahmad al-Mansur's later plans to wage war against the Songhay empire.''-
In fact , i t wa s thi s oppositio n o f th e ulama t o al-Mansur " s expansionis t plan s that , i n
Yahya's opinion , create d th e nee d fo r th e sulta n t o develo p a n elaborat e ideologica l
justification fo r th e war . Yahy a believe s tha t al-Mansur' s meetin g wit h th e Moroeea n
notables was stage d i n orde r t o advocate this ideolog y an d t o quell an y oppositio n t o the
^^ Joh n Hunwic k (citin g Mahmu d al-Ka"ti) , "Ahmad Bab a an d th e Morocca n Invasio n o f th e Suda n
( 1591 )." Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 2 ( 1962), 313.
-^ ^ Elias Saad . Social History of Timbuktu: The Role of Muslim Scholars and Notables. Í4(X)-¡900
{Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) , 18.
^^^ Hunwick discusse s thi s challenge by Ahmad Baba , found i n tbe pages of al-Ifrani . i n "Ahmad Bab a
and the Moroccan Invasio n of the Sudan. ] 59 ]," Journal of Historical Society of Nigeria 2 (1962), 319-24.
*'' Hunwick. Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire, 166.
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invasion befor e i t arose . The result o f thi s meeting wa s that "his shrew d manipulation o f
religion to serve his political and economic interests thus succeeded i n silencing those who
objected o n religious grounds.'"^ •^
While Yahya' s interpretatio n certainl y seem s plausibl e i n explainin g al-Mansur' s
handling o f th e questio n o f th e invasion' s legitimacy , i t onc e agai n fail s t o provid e a n
adequate explanation o f al-Fishtali' s text . A s mentioned above , the text omits any doubts
on th e par t o f th e notable s regardin g th e legitimac y o f on e Musli m dynast y invadin g
another. I f they ha d suc h doubts . al-Fishtali doe s no t mentio n them . Instead , th e notable s
seemed to raise mostly practica l question s about th e possible succes s of suc h an invasion .
Yahya, dependen t upo n th e tex t o f al-Sa'd i an d enamore d wit h hi s propagand a theory ,
seems t o hav e onc e agai n manipulate d th e accoun t o f al-Fishtal i t o suppor t hi s ow n
conclusion.
Perhaps one o f the best insight s int o the sultan' s motive s can b e found i n Charles
A. Julien' s commen t tha t al-Mansu r "ma y hav e desire d t o establish a  wester n caliphat e
that, unde r th e authorit y o f a  descendan t o f th e prophet , migh t late r rival  th e Ottoma n
caliphate."^ I  believe thi s i s exactly wha t al-Mansu r wa s attempting t o accomplish. Thi s
interpretation take s into account al l the evidence that w e have at our disposal: the sultan' s
longstanding rivalr y wit h th e Ottomans , th e intrinsi c importanc e o f th e Sa'd i clai m t o
legitimacy o n th e basi s o f thei r sharifia n status , th e significanc e tha t al-Fishtal i place d
upon th e negotiation s wit h th e Bornu , numerou s calipha l allusion s i n th e Morocca n
correspondence, panegyric references that challenged Ottoman authority i n Moroccan texts
intended fo r distribution i n the Islamic east, and al-Mansur"s own explanation give n t o his
notables tha t h e ha d bee n appointe d a s th e representativ e o f Go d t o rul e th e Islami c
community.^^ Viewe d fro m thi s perspective. al-Mansur's ideologica l justification appear s
to be more than simpl y propagand a developed t o quell th e reservations of unrul y subject s
while the sultan made a move to fill hi s coffers wit h Sudanese gold. It provides insight into
the though t processe s o f a  very ambitiou s ma n wh o ha d dream s o f bringin g abou t a  fa r
more significant golde n era for westem Islam.
An Ephemeral Victor y
Once i t becam e clea r tha t Aski a Isha q ha d n o intentio n o f submittin g t o al-Mansur' s
authority, the Sa'di sultan began preparations for a full-scale invasio n of the Songhay state.
After describin g thes e preparations , the army' s tri p across the Sahara , an d it s astoundin g
victory over the Songhay. al-Fishtali's narrative shifts bac k to Marrakesh, where the sultan
ordered grea t celebration s i n hono r o f hi s army' s victor y ove r th e Askia' s forces . Al -
Fishtali describe s elaborat e festivities , includin g poetr y competition s i n whic h th e poet s
took turns panegyrizing th e brilliant Morocca n triumph.''* ' Greal riche s came to Marrakesh
from Wes t Africa , includin g larg e amount s o f gol d dus t an d man y slaves , s o tha t al -
'•-^  Ibid. , 157 .
^ Julien . History of North Africa, 232.
^^ Fo r furthe r discussio n o f thi s evidence, see Stephen Cory , "Chosen b y God to Rule : The Caliphat e
and Politica l t^gitimac y i n Earl y Mode m Morocco " (Ph.D . thesis . University o f Californi a Sant a Barbara ,
2002).
0^ AI-Fishatli, Manähil al-safö \ 156-63 .
Mansur paid th e salaries of hi s staff i n pure gold.^ ^ The resul t o f thi s astounding victory ,
according to al-Fishtali. was that "the command of al-Mansur was effective fro m Nubi a to
the ocea n o n th e wester n sid e .. . (an d h e gained ) marvelou s authorit y tha t ha d neve r
existed for anyone before him."^ ** I
Regarding th e sueees s o f th e invasion , E.W. Bovil l write s "Th e Suda n campaig n
had certainly failed i n its purpose of obtaining control of the sources of the gold, but i t had
enriched th e already wealth y al-Mansu r on a  scale which cannot hav e lef t hi m with man y
regrets even if few could share his satisfaction."*''^ The sultan investe d his additional wealth
in improving fortifications fo r his country's defense an d in strengthening industry , such as
"re-equipping an d developing th e importan t suga r industr y o f Sus."^ * * Other expenditure s
included lavis h suppor t fo r mosque s an d madrasas , furthe r improvemen t o f al-Mansur' s
grand palac e i n Marrakesh, and plans to construct a  huge mosque i n the central squar e of
the capital .7' I
Yet, despite thes e promising beginnings , th e Sa'di dynast y ultimatel y faile d i n it s
attempts t o hold onto West Africa . Afte r thei r initia l success , Sa'd i troop s encountered an
intensive guerill a wa r le d b y exile d Songha y leaders , whic h eventuall y undermine d
Moroecan authorit y i n the region . Withi n thre e decades , aI-Mansur" s so n Mula y Zayda n
pulled th e plu g o n th e invasion . D o thes e fact s suppor t th e interpretatio n tha t al-Mansu r
was, indeed , intereste d onl y i n Songha y gol d an d no t i n a  lon g term integratio n o f Wes t
Africa int o th e Sa~d i state ? Wha t wer e th e reason s fo r th e shor t duratio n o f effectiv e
Moroccan authority i n West Africa ?
Historians provid e tw o main explanation s fo r thi s failure . Sinc e mos t believ e tha t
al-Mansur was simply interested in milking profits from th e West African gol d mines, they
argue that he made no effort t o develop the infrastructure fo r a more pennanent annexatio n
of Songha y lands . Second , the y clai m tha t Morocc o lacke d th e capacit y t o effectivel y
incorporate th e larg e Songha y territor y int o the Moroccan empire , sinc e i t wa s separate d
from souther n Morocc o b y thousand s o f mile s o f deser t wasteland . Althoug h thei r
superiority i n weaponr y gav e th e Moroccan s a n initia l advantage , th e pennanen t
annexation of this territory was a different story .
The Moroccan historian "Ab d al-Karim Kurayyi m contests the first explanatio n fo r
the failure to annex West Africa. H e argues that the Moroccans attempted to create a stable
administration t o gove m th e country , an d eve n mad e effort s t o improv e agricultura l
methods i n th e region . Tndeed , th e schola r assert s tha t th e majorit y o f th e Morocca n
officials rule d justly , an d di d thei r bes t t o establis h peac e an d securit y i n th e forme r
Songhay lands . He also suggests that al-Mansur took concrete steps to deal with Moroccan
abuses ever y tim e the y wer e brough t t o hi s attention , an d tha t h e establishe d a n
administrative syste m tha t functione d effectivel y fo r th e majorit y o f hi s reign . I n
explaining th e disorde r tha t befel l Wes t Afrie a followin g th e Morocca n conquest .
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Kurayyim place s mos t o f the blame upo n th e Songhay leader s wh o continued t o resis t
Moroccan authority , leadin g t o a  protracte d guerill a wa r throughou t th e region.'^ - I n
addition, misfortune s occurrin g withi n Morocc o itself , includin g a n extended plagu e and
internal unres t afte r 1596 . could b e adduce d t o hel p explai n th e Morocca n failur e t o
establish a more lasting political association with West Africa .
Lansine Kab a mostl y attribute s th e Morocca n failur e t o th e secon d explanatio n
listed above , i.e. , tha t Morocc o lacke d th e capacit y t o effectivel y incorporat e Songha y
territory."^^ Kab a argue s that , althoug h al-Mansu r ha d develope d a  highl y sophisticate d
army (b y sixteenth-centur y standards) , th e Morocca n governmental , stKietal , an d
economic infrastructur e lacke d th e sam e degre e o f sophistication . Indeed , i n orde r t o
develop such an army, al-Mansur ha d been force d t o re!y largely upo n mercenar y troops .
Since thes e soldier s lacke d an y long-tem i Identificatio n wit h Morocc o itself , the y wer e
untrustworthy, tendin g t o be overly hars h i n their administration an d inconsistent i n their
commitment to the sultan's goals.
As indicate d above , mos t historian s conclud e tha t Wes t African s rejecte d al -
Mansur's justifications fo r the invasion an d largely opposed th e Moroccan administratio n
following th e conquest . Thi s conclusio n i s als o commonl y adduce d a s evidenc e t o
demonstrate th e mercenary natur e of the Moroccan endeavor . However , Kurayyim point s
out tha t th e source s identif y a  numbe r o f Songha y leadet ^ wh o initiall y welcome d th e
Moroccans, an d wh o seeme d prepare d t o cooperat e wit h thei r authority."^ " ^ Numerou s
abuses committed b y Moroccan trotip s agains t th e local populatio n appea r to have turned
West African s agains t th e invaders . Mos t Wes t Africans ' experienc e o f thi s "unificatio n
project" wa s violence , turmoil , th e los s o f thei r possessions , an d genera l anarchy."^ ^
Whether the rebellious Songhay ar e blamed fo r this chaos (per Kurayyim), the mercenary
soldiers (pe r Kaba). or the disingenuous aim s of al-Mansur himsel f (pe r Yahya). the end
result wa s no t conduciv e t o gamerin g Wes t Africa n suppor t fo r a  greate r Wester n
Caliphate headed by al-Mansur.
Kaba argues that al-Mansur' s invasion of the Songhay wa s carried ou t mostly with
Europe in view. Desirous of keeping pac e with the European powers , al-Mansur sought to
unite Wes t Afric a unde r hi s authority, i n orde r t o utilize it s resources t o strengthe n hi s
position vis-à-vi s the other Mediterranea n states . However, instea d of achieving thi s goal.
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Kaba believes the invasion turned out to be a eomplete disaster, which "finally swallowe d
up both the conqueror and the conquered."^'' Not only did the continued warfar e devastat e
the West African econom y and society , but the cost of supporting a  long-distance foreig n
war placed undue strain upon the Moroccan economy . I t drained resources that eould have
been bette r used elsewhere to develop an infrastructure t o compete eeonomically wit h the
Europeans.
Ironically, Kab a feel s tha t al-Mansur' s analysi s o f th e internationa l situatio n wa s
accurate. "The genius of al-Mansur, " he writes, "was to understand tha t Morocc o and the
Sudan performe d complementary , i f no t common , eeonomi e role s withi n (the ) globa l
system. I n thi s process , i t seem s tha t som e for m o f religiou s unit y coul d hav e bee n
useful."^^ The downfall o f the ealiphal dream eame i n its implementation, when the sultan
was unabl e to achiev e th e stat e tha t h e ha d envisioned . Hi s ambitio n t o create a  western
caliphate exceeded th e resources he possessed to accomplish thi s goal A  shrewd manager ,
he funnele d thes e resource s int o developin g a  mode m arm y t o buil d upo n th e Sa'd i
reputation fo r militar y success . While thi s strateg y gav e him th e ability t o win battles , he
lacked th e wherewitha l t o maintai n an d develo p th e territor y h e ha d conquered . Kab a
describes the sultan's attempt to utilize modem weapons in the following way:
The "modem" elements of this dynasty's poliey seemed to indicate little qualitative
change i n the socia l structures... . The use of "modem" arms by th e Sultan' s army
did no t mea n tha t hi s stat e had reache d a  modem stag e of development . Rathe r i t
indicated tha t product s of modern technology ma y be "borrowed" and transplanted
elsewhere withou t th e soeia l prerequisite s an d eorollar y suppor t neede d t o mak e
them effective.^ **
Perhaps the seeds of ruin also lay in the caliphal dream itself . In looking backwards
to the great Islamic dynasties of the past. al-Mansur had chosen a model that was no longer
functional i n the sixteenth century . As mentioned above , no dynasty had sueeessfully use d
caliphal claims to assert politica l and religious authority i n a large empire during the three
hundred years prior to the rise ofthe Sa'di s in Morocco.''^ Thus, al-Mansur was altempting
a projec t tha t wa s not bein g undertaken b y an y other contemporary Musli m dynasty . No t
only di d h e lae k th e powe r t o enforce universa l authority , bu t ther e n o longe r remaine d
^* Kaba. "Archers, Musketeers, and Mosquitoes," 457.
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thiit th e calipha l title , "Commander o f tb e Faithful, " wa s rarel y use d t o describ e th e Ottoma n suUan . and
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instance. Colin lmber argues that sixteenth-century Ottoma n claim s to the caliphate were mostly advanced by
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widespread Islami e support for hi s interpretation o f the caliphate.**" The world was a much
different plac e than it had been when the Umayyads and the Abbasids had established thei r
legitimacy throug h th e us e o f ealipha l claims . Ne w way s o f thinkin g ha d eve n begu n t o
infiltrate bot h Morocc o an d Wes t Africa , an d thi s wa s another facto r i n the failure o f al -
Mansur's projeet .
Kaba make s thi s observation whe n h e writes tha t th e retrea t o f th e Aski a and hi s
entourage int o th e histori c Songha y heartlan d "galvanize d th e resistanc e an d gav e a
'national' characte r to it."**' I n a footnote, Kab a explains that resistanc e t o the abuses that
the Moroeean arm y inflicte d upo n th e populaee "assume d a  'national ' characte r i n tha t i t
entailed broa d trans-ethni c feeling s hostil e t o alie n rul e an d base d o n som e typ e o f
common historiea l traditions."** ^ Thus , Kab a see s th e Songha y guerill a movemen t a s
representing the beginnings of proto-nationalist feeling i n West Afriea.**^
Conclusions
The invasio n o f Wes t Afrie a shoul d b e viewe d i n ligh t o f th e ongoin g Sa'd i struggl e
against foreig n domination , whethe r Ottoma n o r European . Th e foundatio n o f Sa'd i
authority rested upon their reputation for sueeessful eonfrontatio n wit h foreign power s and
upon the claim that their sharifian statu s as descendents of the Prophet made them uniquely
qualified t o rul e th e Musli m world . The inheren t logi e o f sue h a  claim mean t tha t othe r
Muslim dynasties must be illegitimate. This line of reasoning had been singularly effectiv e
in combatin g th e Wattasids , wh o ha d n o sue h pedigre e t o bolste r thei r claim s t o
sovereignty. In order to be consistent, however, i t also had to be applied; when dealing with
other Musli m regimes , eve n Islami c dynastie s tha t ha d historicall y bee n a t peac e wit h
Morocco, such a s the neighborin g government s o f Wes t Africa . Indeed , al-Mansu r eoul d
well hav e fel t tha t hi s legitimae y a s rule r depende d upo n a  continue d extensio n o f hi s
authority over those Muslim states that had not yet submitted to Sa'di supremacy .
The writing s o f al-Fishtal i wer e produce d b y a  contemporary o f al-Mansu r wh o
was an eyewitness to many o f th e events that h e reeords. In light o f this fact, al-Fishtali' s
reports hav e been to o readily dismisse d b y moder n historians . Granted, h e wa s hardly an
^^ Fo r example, in the lat e fourteenüi centur y Ib n Khaldun argue d tha t tíie true caliphate had com e to
an en d afte r th e perio d o f th e Rightl y Guide d Caliphs . Wit h th e ris e o f th e Umayyads . "th e characteristi c
traits o f th e caliphat e disappeared , an d onl y it s nam e remained. " Ib n Khaldun , The Muqaddimah: An
Ituroduction to History, trans . Fran z Roscnthal . ed . an d abridge d b y N.J . Dawoo d {Princeton : Princeto n
University Press . 1967) , 156 . This was a commonly hel d belie f amon g the ulama, who took a  rather cynica l
position toward s th e exercis e o f worldl y authority , eve n a s the y encourage d Muslim s t o submi t t o tha t
authority.
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attempts to exert authority ove r tbe region show s that the Moroccan response included a n element of national
consciousness that superseded religious affiliations .
unbiased witness . As a functionary o f the SaMi state , he may be regarded as providing the
official Sa'd i versio n o f events . In addition , i t mus t b e remembered tha t al-Fishtal i cam e
from a  ver y differen t world-vie w tha n d o mode m scholars . Thu s h e ha d n o proble m
describing the atrocities inflicte d upo n the Songhay by Moroccan troops , on the one hand,
and proclaiming that God won a great victory through al-Mansur's invasion, on the other.
However, i f on e consider s al-Fishtali' s premis e tha t al-Mansu r wa s th e rightful
caliph of the entire Muslim world , i t is easier t o understand wh y the sultan neede d to take
decisive actio n agains t a n amir such as Ishaq wh o deliberately flaunte d hi s authority. I t is
also importan t t o keep in mind that al-Fishtal i di d no t possess the benefi t o f hindsight , as
do moder n scholars . Neve r havin g travele d t o th e sultanate s o f Bom u o r Songhay , th e
scribe relied upon reports he received from other s regarding the state of affairs i n those two
empires. Given the constraints under which he wrote. al-Fishtali's account presents reliable
information abou t th e event s h e records . Eve n hi s statement s regardin g th e exten t o f al -
Mansur's ne w empire , whic h ca n definitel y b e show n t o hav e bee n false , shoul d b e
understood withi n the context of Moroccan beliefs, amidst the euphoria that reigned i n the
country during the months directly following th e invasion.
Most mode m historian s to o readil y dismis s al-Mansur' s Islami c justifications a s
propaganda that the monarch used on the gullible masses solely in order to achieve his own
personal ends. It is possible for propaganda to be believed even by those who propagate it .
In the case of al-Mansur , wh o was raised i n an Islamic tradition tha t emphasized sharifia n
descent and th e grea t Musli m dynastie s of th e past , i t i s entirely plausibl e tha t the sulta n
truly believed himsel f to be the anointed caliph who would restore the flagging fortune s of
the Islamic world. There is no doubt tha t al-Mansur shrewdly utilize d current events to his
own advantage. But there is nothing in this fact that contradicts Islamic caliphal tradition .
Al-Mansur observe d th e economic , cultural , an d religiou s connection s betwee n
Morocco and Wes t Africa , an d argued tha t ther e ough t to be political unificatio n a s well .
He believed that unifying Wes t Africa unde r sharifian calipha l leadership would eventually
induce Egyp t t o submit t o Sa'di authorit y an d coul d creat e a  state capable o f challengin g
the Ottomans for supremacy i n the Islamic world.**"* And yet, it was at this point that things
broke down , a s al-Mansu r wa s unabl e t o achiev e hi s drea m o f a  caliphate tha t spanne d
both sides of the Sahara. The unification projec t fo r such a broad expanse of territory wa s
too difficult fo r a  moderate-level stat e suc h as Morocco to achieve . The difficulty o f thi s
project wa s complicate d b y th e fac t tha t Morocco' s lac k o f sophisticate d infrastructur e
created an extreme relianc e upon mercenar y troops , which wer e hard to control ove r such
great distances . Despite the many connections between the two regions, these connections
alone were insufficient t o support political unification .
If Kaba's argument i s correct, al-Mansur' s attemp t a t integrating Wes t Afric a int o
his stat e ha d long-lastin g disastrou s consequence s fo r bot h Nort h an d Wes t Africa . B y
destroying th e stronges t stat e i n sub-Saharan Africa , al-Mansur' s invasio n di d irreparabl e
damage to the trans-Saharan trad e routes that had enriched bot h Morocco and West Africa .
Instead, this trade increasingly bega n to be diverted t o the south, where it was accessed by
European merchant s alon g th e Gold an d Slav e Coasts . The process of devotin g al l o f the
state's energies towards the invasion also exhausted the Sa'di dynasty, making it extremely
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vulnerable t o outsid e interferenc e an d collapse , onc e misfortun e hi t i n th e for m o f th e
plague and various famines. The sons of al-Mansur tore hi s dynasty apar t afte r hi s death,
and Morocc o woul d neve r agai n becom e a  significan t powe r i n th e Islami c o r
Mediterranean worlds .
The ambitious nature of al-Mansur's project le d to its eventual undoing. Because he
was determined to challenge the Ottomans for Islamic leadership . al-Mansur was driven to
expand hi s state , eve n whe n suc h expansio n mean t tryin g t o manag e a  territor y locate d
thousands of miles from hi s eapital an d across the world's larges t desert. By attempting to
establish a  trans-Sahara n politica l unit y unde r sharifia n calipha l leadership , al-Mansu r
hastened divisio n an d decline , leaving bot h Morocc o and Wes t Afrie a unprotecte d befor e
the European onslaught that was to eome in the following centuries.**-' ' The sultan's caliphal
dream tume d ou t t o b e just anothe r deser t mirage , wit h disastrou s consequence s fo r th e
region he had sought to unite.
^^ Kab a make s thi s poin t whe n h e write s "Wit h th e disaste r i n th e Sudan , th e las t grea t Ara b hope ,
unfortunately, cam e tumbling down . Then ther e emerged a  Europe-centered dominio n o f the economy fro m
which th e Maghri b an d Wes t Afric a hav e yet , nearl y 40 0 year s later , t o recover. " Kaba . "Archers .
Musketeers, and Mosquitoes." 475.
